Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ICEPP Working Papers

International Center for Public Policy

2014

Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure and Corruption
Anwar Shah
shah.anwar@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Shah, Anwar, "Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure and Corruption" (2014). ICEPP Working
Papers. 14.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/14

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

INTERNATIONAL In
CENTER FOR
PUBLIC POLICY

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 14-18
January 2014

Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure
and Corruption
Anwar Shah

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 14-18

Decentralized Provision of Public
Infrastructure and Corruption
Anwar Shah
January 2014

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
United States of America
Phone: (404) 651-1144
Fax: (404) 651-4449
Email: hseraphin@gsu.edu
Internet: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html
Copyright 2006, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. No part
of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner.

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including
the International Center for Public Policy.
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy is to provide academic and professional
training, applied research, and technical assistance in support of sound public policy and
sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies.
The International Center for Public Policy at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies is
recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms through
technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving a
diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government
organizations, legislative bodies and private sector institutions.
The success of the International Center for Public Policy reflects the breadth and depth of the
in-house technical expertise that the International Center for Public Policy can draw upon. The
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs. Andrew
Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around the world.
Our technical assistance strategy is not to merely provide technical prescriptions for policy
reform, but to engage in a collaborative effort with the host government and donor agency to
identify and analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions and implement reforms.
The International Center for Public Policy specializes in four broad policy areas:





Fiscal policy, including tax reforms, public expenditure reviews, tax administration reform
Fiscal decentralization, including fiscal decentralization reforms, design of intergovernmental
transfer systems, urban government finance
Budgeting and fiscal management, including local government budgeting, performancebased budgeting, capital budgeting, multi-year budgeting
Economic analysis and revenue forecasting, including micro-simulation, time series
forecasting,

For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please
visit our website at http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html or contact us by email at
hseraphin@gsu.edu.

Decentralized Provision of Public
Infrastructure and Corruption
Anwar Shah
Director of the Centre for Public Economics, Chengdu/Wenjiang, China and advisor/consultant to the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank

ABSTRACT
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize public
decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial. Critics of these reforms argue that
decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption. Proponents of these
reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by bringing
decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers people to hold
government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long run. They further
state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading infrastructure to
underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such decentralization is also
expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local financing. These debates,
nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on infrastructure
provision is scant or non-existent. Empirical work is hampered by a lack of reliable data on the incidence
of corruption. This paper presents conceptual underpinnings of the impact of decentralized provision of
infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesizes scant available empirical evidence to make a
case for further empirical research to document the real world experiences to update our current state of
knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.

The author is grateful to Jonas Frank, Jorge Martinez, Timothy Goodspeed and Francois Vaillencourt and
conference participants for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper presented at the Infrastructure and
Decentralization Conferences organized by the Georgia State University and the World Bank at the Stone Mountain
National Park, Atlanta, GA from September 25-27, 2012 and at the World Bank, Washington, DC from February
13-14, 2013.
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1. Introduction
During the past two decades a silent revolution has swept the globe and a large number of industrial
and developing countries have pursued decentralization reforms that attempt to move public decision
making closer to people. The reform agenda has been pursued through varying combinations of
political. administrative and fiscal decentralization initiatives that aim to shift some traditional central
government functions to intermediate or lower orders of government. These reforms have proven to be
controversial. This is because decentralization is perceived as a solution to some problems such as a
dysfunctional public sector with lack of voice and exit as well as a source of new problems such as
capture by local elite, aggravation of macroeconomic management due to a lack of fiscal discipline, race
to the bottom and potentially greater barriers to common economic and social union through beggarthy-neighbor policies. The impact of decentralization on corruption (defined as the abuse of public office
for private gain or exercise of official powers against public interest) is an area of growing interest
inviting much controversy and debate. While this debate has largely centered on the overall impact of
decentralization, the focus of current paper is to examine various arguments in this debate in the
specific case of decentralized provision of infrastructure – a yet largely unexplored area of research.
What is special about decentralized provision of infrastructure?
Infrastructure projects are typically lumpy, have long gestational periods and are long lived. This implies
that a local government must have assured financing of capital and maintenance costs and a plan for
recovering capital costs and recurring costs over the life of the project. Infrastructure projects are
typically costly and since in most countries local governments have constrained tax autonomy and even
more constrained access to capital market finance, higher level financing and assistance for capital
market access assumes critical importance for initiation of projects. Even if local governments may enjoy
significant tax autonomy, poorer local jurisdictions would not have the revenue capacity to finance
infrastructure provision from own revenue surpluses and would have typically no access to capital
market finance due to a lack of credit worthiness even in the absence of prohibitions usually practiced
against local bond finance. Higher level capital grant financing without local matching funds create
incentives for softer budget constraints as local governments do not have to justify these expenses to
electorate to have buy in for additional taxation. Infrastructure projects may entail inter-jurisdictional
externalities as the optimal size to reap economies of scale may be larger than required by one
jurisdiction such as water purification and waste disposal plants or in the absence of user fees free
ridership may be possible by residents of other jurisdictions such as for roads, bridges, mass transit and
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sports and recreation centers and libraries. Therefore inter-municipal partnerships for cost sharing or
higher level transfers to compensate for benefit spill-outs may be required.
Why it is important to examine the implications of decentralized provision of infrastructure for the
incidence of corruption?
Decentralized provision of infrastructure is advocated for better matching of infrastructure services with
local preferences and needs and for enhancing efficiency and equity of public provision. But if
decentralized provision is seen to lead to a higher incidence of corruption especially with higher order
grant financing then these advantages may be undermined. Corrupt practices in infrastructure affect the
whole project investment and operations cycle and result in projects with roads and bridges to nowhere
and creation of white elephants while a median voter is denied access to basic services such as clean
water and sanitation. Potential of such corrupt practices is enhanced when these projects are mostly
financed by higher order governments which is often a necessity with decentralized provision of
infrastructure or external donors. Since infrastructure projects are typically lumpy and have long
gestational periods, corrupt strategic behavior of current regimes can tie hands of future regimes to the
priorities set by the initiating regime. The times of fiscal stress offer even greater opportunities for
corruption as projects must be approved, financed and implemented on an accelerated schedule. In
view of the potential negative impact of corruption on good governance, it is important to analyze the
implications of decentralized provision of infrastructure for good government both in theory and in
practice with a view to examining options for limiting opportunities for corruption while enhancing
possibilities of detection and punishment. This paper takes an important first step in this direction by
providing a synthesis of conceptual and empirical literature on this subject and highlighting the limits of
our knowledge in this area especially the void in the area of empirical underpinnings of lessons in
combating corruption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introductory review of fundamental concepts
and concerns relating to corruption, its many facets and its drivers. Section 3 highlights corruption
concerns with decentralized infrastructure provision. Section 4 presents counter arguments and
discusses the promise of decentralized provision of infrastructure for improved service delivery and
reduced corruption. Section 5 synthesizes available evidence on the relationship between decentralized
infrastructure provision and corruption. Section 6 draws overall tentative conclusions on the
susceptibility of decentralized provision to corruption. Section 7 draws lessons for a strategy to combat
corruption when infrastructure provision is decentralized. A final section provides concluding remarks.

4
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2. Corruption and Its Drivers: Fundamental Concepts and Concerns
Corruption is defined as exercise of official powers against public interest or the abuse of public office
for private gains. Public sector corruption is a symptom of failed governance. Here, we define
“governance” as the norms, traditions and institutions by which power and authority in a country is
exercised—including the institutions of participation and accountability in governance and mechanisms
of citizens’ voice and exit and norms and networks of civic engagement; the constitutional-legal
framework and the nature of accountability relationships among citizens and governments; the process
by which governments are selected, monitored, held accountable and renewed or replaced; and the
legitimacy, credibility and efficacy of the institutions that govern political, economic, cultural and social
interactions among citizens themselves and their governments.
Concern about corruption — the abuse of public office for private gain — is as old as the history of
government. In the 4th Century BCE, Kautaliya who served as an advisor responded to the Indian King’s
concerns about corruption by arguing that corruption is inevitable. He wrote that “Just as it is not
possible to not to taste honey placed on the surface of the tongue, even so it is not possible for one
dealing with the money of the king not to taste the money in however a small quantity”. He further
advised the king that corruption would be difficult to detect. He stated “Just as fish moving under water
cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed
in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves).”

In 350 B.C.E.,

Aristotle suggested in The Politics that “. . . to protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money
be issued openly in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in various
wards.”
In recent years, concerns about corruption have mounted in tandem with growing evidence of its
detrimental impact on growth and development (see World Bank, 2004). Figures 1 and 2 highlight the
negative consequences of corruption for schooling and access to affordable housing in Indonesia. As a
result of this growing concern, there has been universal condemnation of corrupt practices, leading to
the removal of some country leaders. Moreover, many governments and development agencies have
devoted substantial resources and energies to fighting corruption in recent years. Even so, it is not yet
clear that the incidence of corruption has declined perceptibly, especially in highly corrupt countries.
The lack of significant progress can be attributed to the fact that many programs are simply folk
remedies or “one size fits all” approaches and offer little chance of success. For programs to work, they
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must identify the type of corruption they are targeting and tackle the underlying, country-specific

causes, or “drivers,” of dysfunctional governance. This calls for examination of structure of government
among other factors.
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The many forms of corruption in infrastructure
Corruption is not manifested in one single form; indeed it typically takes at least four broad forms.
Petty, administrative or bureaucratic corruption. Many corrupt acts are isolated transactions
by individual public officials who abuse their office, for example, by demanding bribes and kickbacks,
diverting public funds, or awarding favors in return for personal considerations. Such acts are often
referred to as petty corruption even though, in the aggregate, a substantial amount of public resources
may be involved. For infrastructure provision, petty corruption is often observed for “ greasing the
wheels” in public-private interface in proposals, registration, procurement and access to public services.
Grand corruption. The theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by state officials—
usually members of, or associated with, the political or administrative elite—constitutes grand
corruption. For infrastructure provision , grand corruption occurs in the selection process for public
procurement and in procurement itself and in public-private partnerships and interface. In developing
countries, foreign private sector participation is considered a major source of such corruption.
State or regulatory capture and influence peddling. Collusion by private actors with public
officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit is referred to as state capture. That is, the private
sector “captures” the state legislative, executive, and judicial apparatus for its own purposes. State
capture coexists with the conventional (and opposite) view of corruption, in which public officials extort
or otherwise exploit the private sector for private ends. This form of corruption is prevalent in both
industrial and developing countries.
Patronage/paternalism and being a “team player”. Using official position to provide
assistance to clients having the same geographic, ethnic and cultural origin so that they receive
preferential treatment in their dealings with the public sector including public sector employment. Also
providing the same assistance on a quid pro quo basis to colleagues belonging to an informal network of
friends and allies. Geographic, ethnic and culture based patronage is commonplace in developing
countries and “team player” form of corruption is fact of everyday life in industrial countries.
It is also known that corruption is country-specific; thus, approaches that apply common policies
and tools (that is, one-size-fits-all approaches) to countries in which acts of corruption and the quality of
governance vary widely are likely to fail. One needs to understand the local circumstances that
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encourage or permit public and private actors to be corrupt. Finally, we know that if corruption is about
governance and governance is about the exercise of state power, then efforts to combat corruption
demand strong local leadership and ownership if they are to be successful and sustainable.
Many facets of corruption in the provision of infrastructure
An important distinguishing aspect of infrastructure corruption is that mostly it comes in the form of
grand corruption which is commonplace in both industrial and developing countries. OECD estimates
that in OECD countries bribe rate in procurement for construction projects ranges from 5 to 25% of
contract value (Ehlermann-Cache, 2007). In developing countries guesstimates place these much higher.
Industrial countries have largely been successful in eliminating petty corruption through higher wages
which remains widespread and adversely affects billions of people in developing countries. Table 1
highlights the incidence of corruption in infrastructure provision at various decision points in the
legislative-executive-private sector interface in provision of public infrastructure.
Table 1. Many facets of corruption in the provision of infrastructure – decentralized or not
Decision Point

Incidence of corruption

Type of corruption

Lobbying legislators for pet

Grand corruption, State capture

projects, log rolling, political

(universal phenomenon)

AT APPRAISAL/PLANNING STAGE
Legislative framework

campaign financing, perks and
privileges in exchange for
legislative favors, preparation of
draft legislation by lobbyists
Policy making

Regulation

Policy framework to suit special

Executive capture, grand

interest groups and bribe payers

corruption, most countries

Zoning and Regulatory

Executive capture, grand

framework tailored to favor

corruption, most countries

special interest groups. Extortion
over licensing.
Planning and Budgeting

Rezoning and selection of

Executive capture, grand

projects based upon bribes

corruption, most countries
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received.
AT PROJECT FINANCING STAGE
External Financing

Higher costs of externally

Executive capture, grand

financed projects,

corruption, most developing

Donors favor PPPs especially

countries

with foreign participation.
Kickbacks in return for favorable
terms.
Bond Financing

Higher costs for floating bonds

Grand corruption, some
developing countries

Grant Financing

Pork barrel grants as quid pro

Grand corruption by financing

quo for political finance

pork projects such as “The
Bridge to Nowhere in Alaska”,
most countries

Tax Financing

Elite capture

Grand corruption though tax
expenditures and financing of
projects preferred by elites

AT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
Public-private partnerships

Collusion among public

Grand corruption, most

managers and private providers

countries

to give favorable terms to
private participants in return for
a bribe commonly practiced in
energy and road projects, renegotiation of contracts during
and after execution
Program and project

Ghost projects, ghost

Mostly grand corruption, most

management

employees, phantom

developing countries

expenditures
Public procurement

Kick backs, rigged bidding and

Mostly grand corruption, most

tendering. Mechanisms:

countries
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intermediary collusion,
consulting fees, false services,
overpayment, payment to a
front company, Swiss and
Cayman Island bank accounts,
collusion among competitors.
Procurement cycle: registration,
manipulating specifications,
insider info, quality reduction,
clearance from inspectors,
expediting payments.
Construction

Use of low quality materials,

Mostly grand corruption, most

theft of materials, false prices

developing countries

False reporting, ghost workers

Mostly grand corruption, most

AT OPERATIONS STAGE
Operations and maintenance

developing countries
User Charges

Theft and free ridership

Petty corruption, most
developing countries

Public access

Delay or denial of access

Petty corruption , most
developing countries

AT EX-POSTEVALUATION STAGE
Evaluation

Project financing and selection
of evaluators leads to lack of
independence and biased
evaluations

Source: Author’s perspectives

Patronage, most countries

10

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series

Table 2. Vulnerability to corruption observed in decentralized or not provision of infrastructure in various
sectors
Water and Sanitation

Land acquisition, Selection of contractors, bid rigging, compromising
quality, bribes for connections, meter tampering, conflict of interest with
officials involved in private provision, collusion with companies offering
bottled water or tanker provision.

Roads

Land acquisition at above market prices, rehabilitation, selection of
contractors, false procurement and maintenance expenditures,
certification of quality of construction

Electricity

Public utilities: Land acquisition, rights of way, rehabilitation, equipment
purchase and repair mark ups, patronage appointments, defective
meters, meter tampering, theft of electricity by tapping distribution lines
with side payments, connections delays, false billing, response to nonpayment of bills, false subsidy payments, public sector guarantees for
assured demand for supply at above market rates
Private utilities: Selection, regulatory regime, price hikes, regulators
turning blind eye to capital deterioration

Hospitals

Ghost hospitals, bribes for admissions and drugs, false procurement and
construction,

Schools

Ghost schools, bribes for admissions, ghost enrollments, false
procurement and corruption

Fitness and Recreation centers

Padding up cost of construction and purchase of equipment

Source: Author’s perspectives
Vulnerability to corruption is significant regardless of centralization or decentralization of provision as
described in Table 2. With decentralization, however, the probability of detection of corruption is
significantly enhanced.
What drives corruption?
Public sector corruption, as a symptom of failed governance, depends on multitude of factors such as
the quality of public sector management, the nature of accountability relations between the
government and citizens, the legal framework and the degree to which public sector processes are
accompanied by transparency and dissemination of information. Efforts to address corruption that fail
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to adequately account for these underlying “drivers” are unlikely to generate profound and sustainable
results. To understand these drivers, a conceptual and empirical perspective is needed to understand
why corruption persists and what can be a useful antidote. At the conceptual level, a number of
interesting ideas have been put forward. These ideas can be broadly grouped together in three
categories (a) Principal- agent or agency models; (b) new public management perspectives; and (c) neoinstitutional economics frameworks.

Conceptual Perspectives on Drivers of Corruption
Principal- Agent Models
This is the most widely used modeling strategy. A common thread in these models is that the
government is led by a benevolent dictator, the principal, who aims to motivate government officials
(agents) to act with integrity in the use of public resources (see Becker, 1968, Becker and Stigler, 1974,
Banfield 1975, Rose Ackerman 1975, 1978, Klitgaard 1988, 1991, Becker 1983). One such view, the socalled crime and punishment model by Gary Becker (1968), states that self-interested public officials
seek out or accept bribes so long as the expected gains from corruption exceed the expected costs
(detection and punishment) associated with corrupt acts. Thus, according to this view, corruption could
be mitigated by (a) reducing the number of transactions over which public officials have discretion; (b)
reducing the scope of gains from each transaction; (c) increasing the probability for detection; and (d)
increasing the penalty for corrupt activities. Moreover, since it is costly to increase detection, but not to
increase penalties (at least assuming detection is accurate), the most efficient way to eliminate
corruption is to impose very high penalties with a relatively low probability of detection. Klitgaard
(1988) restates this model to emphasize the unrestrained monopoly power and discretionary authority
of government officials. According to him, corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus
accountability. To curtail corruption under this framework, one has to have a rules-driven government
with strong internal controls and with little discretion to public officials. This model gained wide
acceptance in public policy circles and served as a foundation for empirical research and policy design to
combat administrative, bureaucratic, or petty corruption. Experience in highly corrupt countries,
however, contradicts the effectiveness of such an approach as the rules enforcers themselves add extra
burden of corruption and lack of discretion is also thwarted by collusive behavior of corruptors. In fact
lack of discretion is often cited as a defense by corrupt officials who partake in corruption as part of a
vertically well-knit network enjoying immunity from prosecution.

12
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Another variant of principal-agent models integrates the role of legislators and elected officials in the
analysis. In this variant, high level government officials −represented by legislators or elected public
officials− institute or manipulate existing policy and legislation in favor of particular interest groups −
representing private sector interests and entities or individual units of public bureaucracy competing for
higher budgets− in exchange of rents or side payments. In this framework, legislators weigh the
personal monetary gains from corrupt practices and improved chances of re-election against the chance
of being caught, punished and losing an election with a tarnished reputation. Factors affecting this
decision include campaign financing mechanisms, information access by voters, the ability of citizens to
vote out corrupt legislators, the degree of political contestability, electoral systems, democratic
institutions and traditions and institutions of accountability in governance. Examples of such analyses
include: Rose-Ackerman (1978), Andvig & Moene (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1994), Flatters &
Macleod (1995), Chand & Moene (1997), Van Rijckeghem & Weder, (1998), Acconcia D’Amato &
Martina (2003). This conceptual framework is useful in analyzing political corruption or state capture.
There is a fine line dividing theoretical models that focus on the effects of localization on corruption and
those that analyze the decentralization of corruption within a multi-tier hierarchy from an “industrial
organization of corruption” type of framework. In the latter group a distinction is made between “topdown corruption” −where corrupt high levels buy lower levels by sharing a portion of gains− and
“bottom-up corruption” −where low level officials share their own collected bribes with superior levels
to avoid detection or punishment. The former phenomenon is more likely to exist in a federal system of
governance where powers may be shared among various orders of government and the alternate is
more likely to prevail under unitary or centralized forms of governance or dictatorial regimes. The
impact of governance on the corruption networks is an interesting yet unresearched topic. Tirole (1986)
analyzed one aspect of this network by means of a three-tier principal-supervisor-agent model (see also
Guriev 1999). This extension of a conventional principal-agent model assists in drawing inferences
regarding the type of corrupt relations that could evolve under a three-tier unitary government
structure. These inferences are highly sensitive to underlying assumptions regarding principal-agent
relationships under a multi-tiered system of governance (four-tier hierarchies are modeled by Carillo
2000, Bac & Bag 1998). In Guriev’s three-tier hierarchy model the mid level bureaucrat supervises the
agent and reports to the principal. In comparing the characteristics of equilibria with top-bottom-and all
level corruption Guriev concludes that top−level corruption “is not efficient, as it redistribute rents in
favor of agents, and therefore makes it more attractive for potential entrants” (p.2) and thereby leading
to higher total corruption.
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Shleifer and Vishny (1993) utilize conventional industrial organization theory model and conclude that
decentralization is likely to increase corruption. In this model, government bureaucracies and agencies
act as monopolists selling complimentary government-produced goods which are legally required for
private sector activity. The main idea behind the model is that under centralized corruption
bureaucracies act like a joint monopoly, whereas under decentralized corruption bureaucracies behave
as independent monopolies. When bureaucracies act as independent monopolies, they ignore the
effects of higher prices on the overall demand for a good and hence drive up the cumulative bribe
burden.
Waller, Verdier and Gardner (2002) define decentralized corruption as a system in which higher level
officials collect a fixed amount of bribe income from each of the bureaucrats that take bribes, without
mandating on the bribe size that the bureaucrats charge. In a centralized system, on the contrary, bribe
size is determined by the higher level of government which collects them from bureaucrats and
redistributes it among them after keeping a share. Waller et al. posit that decentralized corruption leads
to lower levels of total corruption in the economy (lower spread), higher levels of bribe per
entrepreneur (higher depth), and a smaller formal sector vis-a-vis a centralized corruption equilibrium.
Yet, these results vary widely for specific ‘regimes’ in the model −when given parameters satisfy key
conditions− for instance, for high-enough wages and monitoring systems, centralized corruption may
reduce total corruption and expand the formal economy.
While previously discussed studies centered on the organizational structure of corruption, Ahlin (2001)
differs by concentrating on the effects of bureaucratic decentralization. Under the assumption of no
interregional mobility, corruption increases with the degree of bureaucratic decentralization but is
independent of the degree of regional decentralization, whereas for perfect interregional mobility
corruption decreases with regional decentralization and is independent of bureaucratic decentralization.
A key intuition of the model is that corrupt bureaucrats fail to internalize the costs of increases in bribecharges imposed on other bureaucrats. Arikan (2004) uses a tax competition framework to examine
localization-corruption links and finds that higher degree of decentralization is expected to lead to
lower levels of corruption. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000a) shed light upon the determinants of
capture of the democratic process. Not surprisingly, they conclude that the extent of relative capture is
ambiguous and context specific.
In conclusion, no definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding corruption and the centralizationdecentralization nexus from the agency type conceptual models. These models simply reaffirm that the

14
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incidence of corruption is context dependent and therefore cannot be uncovered by generalized
models.
New Public Management Frameworks
The new public management (NPM) literature, on the other hand, points to a more fundamental
discordance among the public sector mandate, its authorizing environment and the operational culture
and capacity. According to NPM, this discordance contributes to government acting like a runaway train
and government officials indulging in rent-seeking behaviors with little opportunity for citizens to
constrain government behavior. This viewpoint calls for fundamental civil service and political reforms
to create a government under contract and accountable for results. Public officials will no longer have
permanent rotating appointments but instead they could keep their jobs as long as they fulfilled their
contractual obligations (see Shah, 1999, 2005).

The new public management (NPM) paradigms have clear implications for the study of localization and
corruption as it argues for contractual arrangements in provision of public services. Such a contractual
framework may encourage competitive service delivery through outsourcing, purchaser-provider split
under a decentralized structure of governance. The NPM goals are harmonious with decentralization as
greater accountability for results reinforces government accountability to citizens through voice and exit
mechanisms. Conceptually, therefore, the NPM is expected to reduce opportunities for corruption (see
Shah 1999, 2005). Andrews and Shah (2005) integrate these two ideas in a common framework of
citizen-centered governance. They argue that citizen empowerment holds the key to enhanced
accountability and reduced opportunities for corruption.

Others disagree with such conclusions and argue that the NPM could lead to higher corruption as
opposed to greater accountability. This may happen because the tendering for service delivery and
separation of purchasers from providers may lead to increased rent seeking behavior and enhanced
possibilities for corruption (Batley 1999, Von Maravic, 2003). Further some argue that decentralized
management leads to weaker vertical supervision from higher levels and the inadequacy of mechanisms
to exert controls over decentralized agencies (Scharpf, 1997). This loss in vertical accountability is seen
as a source of enhanced opportunities for corruption. Of course, this viewpoint simply neglects potential
gains from higher horizontal accountability.
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Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE) Frameworks
Finally, Shah (2006) has utilized the transactions costs approach of the neo-institutional economics (NIE)
to present a newer perspective on the causes and cures of corruption. Shah argues that corruption
results from opportunistic behavior of public officials (agents) given that citizens (as governors and
principals) are either not empowered or face high transaction costs to hold public officials accountable
for their corrupt acts. The principals have bounded rationality – they act rationally based upon the
incomplete information they have. In order to have a more informed perspective on public sector
operations, they face high transaction costs in acquiring and processing the information. On the other
hand, agents (public officials) are better informed. This asymmetry of information allows agents to
indulge in opportunistic behavior which goes unchecked due to high transactions costs faced by the
principals and a lack of or inadequacy of countervailing institutions to enforce accountable governance.
Thus corrupt countries have inadequate mechanisms for contract enforcement, weak judicial systems
and inadequate provision for public safety. This raises the transactions costs in the economy further
raising the cost of private capital as well as the cost of public service provision. The problem is further
compounded by path dependency (i.e. a major break with the past is difficult to achieve as any major
reforms are likely to be blocked by influential interest groups), cultural and historical factors and mental
models where those who are victimized by corruption feel that attempts to deal with corruption will
lead to further victimization, with little hope of corrupt actors being brought to justice. These
considerations lead principals to the conclusion that any attempt on their part to constrain corrupt
behaviors will invite strong retaliation from powerful interests. Therefore, citizen empowerment (e.g.
through decentralization, citizens’ charter, bill of rights, elections and other forms of civic engagement)
assumes critical importance in combating corruption because it may have a significant impact on the
incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to public interest.

3. The Perils of Decentralized Provision of Infrastructure in Breeding
Corruption
A number of arguments have been advanced to support the notion that corruption increases with
localization. A few of these are summarized below.

a) Personalism. Vito Tanzi (1995) argued that localization brings officials in close contact with
citizens. This promotes personalism and reduces professionalism and arms length relationships.
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Personalism in his view breeds corruption as officials pay greater attention to individual citizen needs
and disregard public interest. Further, a higher degree of discretion at the local level and long tenure of
local officials make it easier to establish unethical relationships (Prud’homme 1995).

b) Weak monitoring and vertical controls. Impediments to corrupt practices also decrease as
local politicians and bureaucrats collude to advance narrow self-interests while the effectiveness of
auditing agencies and monitoring from the central level wanes (Prud’homme 1995). Localization may
increase the motivation for corruption among public officials by creating an impression that they are
subject to lower monitoring, control and supervision.

c) Fiscal decentralization and overgrazing. Treisman argues that decentralized federal systems
tend to have higher corruption ratings due to (a) their larger size; (b) more likely to have separate police
forces at both central and sub-national levels (which increases corruption due to overgrazing) and their
greater propensity to have a regionally elected upper house of parliament with veto power (which also
may increase corruption as regional governments may buy off these veto-players or have greater
leverage to protect their ill-gotten gains). Using cross country regression analysis Treisman (1999, 2000,
2002) presents empirical evidence that support the existence of this negative relationship. Treisman’s
empirical results, however, are sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the equation and may have
omitted variables bias in view of a lack of underlying framework for corruption.
A recent study by Fan, Lin and Treisman (2007) provides a more nuanced view of the impact of fiscal
decentralization. Combining cross-sectional secondary data for 80 countries with a survey of 9000
business owners, it finds that “in countries with large number of government or administrative tiers and
(given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent.
When local or central governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent”
(p.1). These results suggest that while decentralization in general opens up possibilities for rent seeking
by a larger number of individuals, tax decentralization limits such opportunities by bringing greater
citizen oversight of local government operations.

d) Political decentralization and lack of discipline. Political decentralization is seen as a
cascading system of bribes by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They note that “to invest in a Russian
company, a foreigner must bribe every agency involved in foreign investment including the foreign
investment office, the relevant industrial ministry, the finance ministry, the executive branch of the local
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government, the legislative branch, the central bank, the state property bureau, and so on.” (p. 615). In
the same vain, Bardhan (1997) and Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) [B&S] have argued that political
centralization leads to lower levels of corruption. B&S sustain that political decentralization is seen as a
source of corruption in Russia but not China. This conclusion emerges from the contrasting role of local
governments in their relations with local enterprises observed in China and Russia. In China, local
governments have provided a supporting role whereas in Russia, local governments have stymied the
growth of new firms through taxation, regulation and corruption. The authors note that behavior of
Russian local governments can be explained by (a) state capture by old firms, leading local governments
to protect them from competition and (b) rent seeking behavior of local officials discouraging new firms
to enter. The authors attribute this contrasting experience to presence of political decentralization in
Russia and its absence in China. They argue that political centralization in China contributes to party
discipline which in turn reduces the risk of local capture and corruption. However, B&S analysis does not
pay sufficient attention to local-enterprise relations in the two countries. Local enterprises in China are
owned and run by local governments and even deliver local services such as education, health and
transportation in addition to their economic functions. Thus local enterprises are part and parcel of the
local government. In Russia, on the other hand, a mixed pattern of these relationships has begun to
emerge. Therefore, the contrasting experience of the local governments may better be explained by
agency problems rather than by political decentralization. In fact the weakening of party discipline
through the emergence of powerful local leaders may be contributing to growth of local industry as the
strong arm of central planning is held at bay by these leaders.
e) Interest group capture. Opportunities for corruption increase due to a greater influence of
interest groups at the local level (Prud’homme 1995). In this regard, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000a)
argue that the probability of capture by local interest groups could be greater at the local level if, for
example, interest group cohesiveness (fraction of the richest class that contribute to lobby) is higher, or
the proportion of informed voters is lower at the local level. Lower levels of political awareness at the
local level and less coverage of local elections by media may also impair local democracy and lead to
higher capture. The notion of capture at the local levels due to weaknesses of the democratic system
has also been raised by Shah (1998). Concerns about risks of local capture are also expressed in a recent
World Bank Study (World Bank, 2004). The study argues that decentralization may increase
opportunities for corruption in some developing countries where interference in public administration is
the norm, merit culture and management systems in the civil service are weak and institutions of
participation and accountability are ineffective. The issue is significant, for example, in Pakistan and
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Philippines and also relevant to Guatemala and Tanzania where more limited decentralization has been
carried out. Pakistan has recently carried out a strong program of devolution to the provinces (Shah,
2012). Given systemic politicization of public services in Pakistan, decentralization to the provinces may
intensify rather than reduce pressures for political/bureaucratic collusion, although this may be further
mitigated by further administrative decentralization, giving elected local officials the power to, hire, fire
and set terms of employment of civil servants in their jurisdiction. Note that administration
decentralization in areas under feudal influence is likely to exacerbate the corruption concerns. Identical
concerns are pertinent in Philippines, where legislation in 1991 devolved to regions and localities
powers to provide services and raise revenues. In Philippines, there is a long tradition of elected local
public offices rotating among family members. The World Bank study is concerned with the effect of
decentralization on corruption when there is a local capture by political and bureaucratic elites. There is
little disagreement in the literature that in such a situation, localization without fundamental electoral
and land reforms, is likely to increase corruption. On the contrary, the perception of localization as a
breeding ground for corruption in the presence of democratic participation and accountability, is neither
grounded in theory nor in evidence.
f) Lack of competition fosters collusive practices. It has been argued that in environments with
weak or less developed private sector, as found in many developing countries, lack of competition at the
local level fosters corruption in public-private sector interface as third party oversight is missing in such
an environment. A national database on benchmarking could limit such opportunities for corruption as
local residents would be better informed about costs of comparable operations in other jurisdictions.
Table 3 attempts to capture the impact of the multitude of negative influences of
decentralization on the incidence of corruption at various decision points. These negative influences
dominate in the absence of representative democracy and competitive market pressures typically found
in rural feudal dominated local governments. They are typically found also in urban areas when a few
dominant developers build special patronage relatoionships with local council members.
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Table 3. Perils of decentralized provision of infrastructure at various decision points
Decision Point

Impact of decentralization on

Impact by type of corruption

the incidence of corruption
AT APPRAISAL/PLANNING STAGE
Legislative framework

In rural areas where feudal or

Enhanced opportunities for

industrial elites may dominate

grand corruption through state

local councils local government

capture

may serve the interests of elite
to the neglect of its services to
rural residents at large.
Policy making

Rural councils dominated by

Enhanced executive capture,

elites can impose policy

grand corruption

framework to suit special
interest groups and bribe payers
Regulation

Greater possibility of having

Enhanced executive capture,

zoning to favor developer

grand corruption

interests in exchange for political
finance and bribes and
regulatory framework tailored to
favor special interest groups
Planning and Budgeting

Greater opportunities for

Enhanced executive capture,

rezoning and selection of

grand corruption

projects based upon bribes and
other benefits received.
AT PROJECT FINANCING STAGE
External Financing

Higher costs of externally

Enhanced executive capture,

financed projects,

grand corruption, most

Donors favor PPPs especially

developing countries

with foreign participation.
Kickbacks in return for favorable
terms.
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Bond Financing

No impact

Negligible incidence of
corruption

Grant Financing

Some pork barrel grants as quid

Some grand corruption by

pro quo for political finance still

financing pork projects as bridge

possible

to nowhere in Alaska, most
countries

Tax Financing

Little impact

AT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
Public-private partnerships

Collusion among public

Grand corruption persists when

managers and private providers

transparency and competitive

to give favorable terms to

pressures are lacking

private participants in return for
a bribe commonly practiced in
energy and road projects, renegotiation of contracts during
and after execution
Program and project

Little perverse impact

management
Public procurement

Kick backs, rigged bidding and

Grand corruption could be

tendering still possible.

enhanced in the short run

Mechanisms: intermediary
collusion, consulting fees, false
services, overpayment, payment
to a front company, collusion
among competitors.
Procurement cycle: registration,
manipulating specifications,
insider info, quality reduction,
clearance from inspectors,
expediting payments.
Construction

Use of low quality materials,

Mostly grand corruption, most
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theft of materials, false prices

developing countries

False reporting still possible

Mostly grand corruption, most

AT OPERATION STAGE
Operations and maintenance

developing countries
User Charges

Theft and free ridership feasible

Petty corruption could go up in
the short run

Public access

Isolated incidences of delays or

Some petty corruption

denial of access still possible
AT EX-POST EVALUATION STAGE
Evaluation

Biased favorable evaluation

Patronage – most countries

Source: Author’s perspectives
Table 4 attempts to draw the implications of these negative influences for corruption in
individual sectors. Patron-client relationships immune from public scrutiny are the major sources of
various forms of corruption.
Table 4. Enhanced Vulnerability to corruption introduced by decentralized provision of infrastructure in
various sectors
Water and Sanitation

Favoritism in selection of contractors, bid rigging, bribes for connections,
meter tampering, conflict of interest with officials involved in private
provision, collusion with companies offering bottled water or tanker
provision.

Roads, bridges and mass transit

Favoritism in selection of contractors, some false procurement and
maintenance expenditures, and false certification of quality of
construction still possible

Electricity

Public utilities: equipment purchase and repair mark ups, patronage
appointments, defective meters, meter tampering, theft of electricity by
tapping distribution lines with side payments, connections delays, false
billing, response to non-payment of bills, false subsidy payments, public
sector guarantees for assured demand for supply at above market rates
Private utilities: Selection, regulatory regime, price hikes, regulators
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turning blind eye to capital deterioration
Hospitals

false procurement and padding up of construction costs, bribes for
admissions and drugs

Schools

false procurement and padding up of construction costs, false
enrollments, bribes for admissions

Fitness, sports and recreation

Padding up cost of construction and purchase of equipment

centers
Source: Author’s perspectives

4. The Promise of Decentralized Provision of Infrastructure in Limiting
Opportunities for Corruption
Decentralization’s ability to curtail corruption opportunities has been commonly based on the potential
for greater accountability when the decision making is closer to the people. This line of thought is
supported from the following perspectives:
a) Competition among local governments for mobile factors of production re-inforces the
accountability culture. Such enhanced accountability has the potential to reduce corruption (Weingast,
1995, Arikan 2000).
b) Exit and voice mechanisms at the local level. There is a general agreement in the literature
that localization can open up greater opportunities for voice and choice thereby making the public
sector more responsive and accountable to citizens-voters. Furthermore, due to regional heterogeneity
of political preferences localization may reduce the range of potential capture by a unique nationally
dominant party.
c) Higher levels of information. Seabright (1996) argues that accountability is always better at
the local level, since local citizens who are better informed about government performance can vote
these governments out of office. Under centralization people vote for parties or candidates partly on the
basis of performance in other regions and partly on issues of national interest. As a result accountability
is defused and potential for corruption increases. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000b) also argue that
decentralization in developing countries promotes cost-effectiveness and reduces corruption, owing to
the superior access of local governments to information on local costs and needs.
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d) Lower expected gains from corruption but greater probability of detection and punishment.
Administrative decentralization causes a loss in control to higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to
monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption as,
following decentralization, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision is reduced. It
is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to bear the consequences of their actions. This line of
thought complements those put forward by Carbonara (1999); who concludes that decentralization
although creating agency problems inside an organization can help in controlling corruption; and
Wildasin (1995), who argues that local officials with limited powers have little scope to engage in grand
corruption.
e) Reduced corruption due to reduction in information asymmetry between politicians and
bureaucrats. Ahlin (2000) has argued that deconcentration has the potential to increase corruption,
whereas political decentralization has the potential to contain it due to interjurisdictional competition.
This may result from a reduction in the information asymmetry between bureaucrats and the politicians
that appoint them vis a vis a politically centralized systems. Crook and Manor (2000) examined the
process of political decentralization in India (Karnatka state), Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana and
find that such decentralization leads to enhanced transparency. With this enhanced transparency,
ordinary citizen become better aware of government’s successes and failures and they may perceive the
government institutions more corrupt than the perception they had before. They observed that in
Karnatka, India, political decentralization substantially reduced the amount of public funds diverted by
powerful individuals. However, since citizens were not aware of these diversions, they concluded that
corruption had increased. Crook and Manor based upon evidence from Karnatka conclude that political
decentralization reduces grand theft but increases petty corruption in the short run but in the long run
both may go down. Olowu (1993) also finds political centralization as a root cause of endemic corruption
in Africa. Fiszbein (1997) based upon a review of political decentralization in Colombia concludes that
competition for political office opened the door for responsible and innovative leadership that in turn
became the driving force behind capacity building, improved service delivery and reduced corruption at
the local level.
f) Improved local accountability with administrative decentralization reduces corruption. A few
studies show that administrative decentralization reduces corruption. Wade (1997) finds that overcentralized top down management accompanied by weak communication and monitoring systems
contributes to corruption and poor delivery performance for canal irrigation in India. Kuncoro (2000)
finds that with administrative decentralization in Indonesia, firms relocated to areas with lower bribes.
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g) Local fiscal autonomy improves economic management and reduces corruption. Huther and
Shah (1998) using international cross-section and time series data find that fiscal decentralization is
associated with enhanced quality of governance as measured by citizen participation, political and
bureaucratic accountability, social justice, improved economic management and reduced corruption.
Arikan (2004) reconfirms the same result. De Mello and Barenstein (2001) based upon cross-country
data conclude that tax decentralization is positively associated with improved quality of governance.
Fisman and Gatti (2002) find a negative relation between fiscal decentralization and corruption. Gurgur
and Shah (2002) is the only study providing a comprehensive theoretical and empirical framework on
the root causes of corruption. They identify major drivers of corruption in order to isolate the effect of
decentralization. In a sample of industrial and non-industrial countries, lack of service orientation in the
public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal
bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making are identified as the major causes of corruption.
For a non-industrial countries sample, drivers for corruption are lack of service orientation in the public
sector, weak democratic institutions and closed economy. Decentralization reduces corruption but has a
greater negative impact on corruption in unitary countries than in federal countries. They conclude that
decentralization is confirmed to support greater accountability in the public sector and reduced
corruption.
h) Lower transactions costs for citizens to hold the government to account. Decentralization
brings greater clarity in division of responsibilities and services that are delivered locally, citizens’
transactions costs to hold the government to account are significantly reduced as they have better
information on service delivery performance and costs as well as redress opportunities and mechanisms.
i) Greater Transparency. Local government operations are by their nature more transparent due
to greater local knowledge. In the USA, this transparency is further enhanced by output based budgeting
and reporting adopted by most local governments voluntarily to build citizens’ trust. In such an
environment collusive practices are well recognized by citizens thereby curtailing corrupt practices.
Table 5 captures the combined impact of the confluence of factors mentioned above to limit
opportunities for corruption while enhancing potential for detection and prosecution at various points
in public decision making. The table shows that decentralization will have some positive influence on
curtailing corruption at almost all decision points. However, decentralization offers some promising
entry points for having a major impact on reducing corruption. First major entry point is public hearings
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on zoning. This process offers residents an opportunity to learn reasons behind rezoning and interest
groups involved. The second and probably the most important entry point in curtailing corruption is the
public procurement process. The transparency and integrity of this process will significantly curtail the
incidence of corruption. The incidence of corruption also depends upon the nature and source of
infrastructure finance available to local governments. If financing is no concern as in oil rich countries,
incidence of corruption may be higher as the local governments no longer have to seek approval of
additional financing or justify such expenses to local electorate. The incidence of corruption is
accentuated by having non-elected local governments as in the Middle East. Local governments that
finance infrastructure projects from own sources are likely to have a greater integrity of the entire
project cycle due to active involvement of electorate in ensuring that their tax dollars to put to best use.
Thus citizen activism and openness of the democratic processes plays a critical role in curtailing the
impact of corruption.
Table 5. Potential of Decentralization in curtailing corruption at various decision points
Decision Point

Impact of Decentralization on

Impact by the type of corruption

the Incidence of corruption
AT APPRAISAL/PLANNING STAGE
Legislative framework

In urban areas with greater

Opportunities for grand

citizens engagement, lobbying

corruption are curtailed due to

influences and perks and

smaller projects and greater

privileges in exchange for

transparency. State capture rare

legislative favors are

in urban areas.

constrained.
Policy making

Policy framework to suit special

Executive capture and grand

interest groups and bribe payers

corruption is reduced in most

stunted due to adversarial

countries

citizen watch groups
Regulation

Extortion over licensing is

Executive capture and grand

eliminated.

corruption is reduced in most
countries

Planning and Budgeting

Competitive providers limit

Executive capture, grand
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rezoning and selection of

corruption is reduced in most

projects based upon bribes

countries

received.
AT PROJECT FINANCING STAGE
External Financing

No positive impact

Executive capture, grand
corruption, most developing
countries

Bond Financing

Little opportunity for corruption

Incidence of corruption is

in bond financing as it is only

minimal.

done for major metropolitan
areas with central oversight
Grant Financing

Competitive inter-jurisdictional

Grand corruption opportunities

pressures typically result in

are constrained.

transparent formula driven grant
financing limiting funds for pork
barrel grants as quid pro quo for
political finance
Tax Financing

Greater transparency in local tax

Grand corruption though tax

policy and administration limits

expenditures and financing of

elite capture

projects preferred by elites is
curtailed

AT IMPLEMENTATION STAGE
Public-private partnerships

Little impact on public official

Little impact on opportunities for

and private managers collusive

grand corruption in most

practices due to complex

countries

contractual relationship not
easily understood by
residents/voters.
Program and project

Greater transparency in

Opportunities for grand

management

decentralized provision largely

corruption are greatly

eliminates potential for ghost

constrained.
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projects, ghost employees,
phantom expenditures
Public procurement

Construction

Potential for kick backs, rigged

Opportunities for grand

bidding and tendering is greatly

corruption reduced in most

reduced.

countries

Benchmarking limits

Grand corruption is curtailed.

opportunities for padding costs.
AT OPERATION STAGE
Operations and maintenance

False reporting, ghost workers

Opportunities for grand

constrained due to citizen

corruption curtailed in most

feedback loops

developing countries

User Charges

Little impact

Little impact on petty corruption

Public access

Some positive impact on delay

Petty corruption reduced

or denial of access due to timely
recourse and lower transactions
costs for citizens to hold corrupt
officials to account.
AT EX-POST EVALUATION STAGE
Evaluation

Independent evaluations and

Patronage curtailed

citizen-based monitoring and
evaluation lead to fair
evaluations.
Source: Author’s perspectives
Table 6 embodies the influence of decentralized institutions on combating corruption to develop
an aggregate view of these influences at the sector level. The table highlights potential positive
influences of government closeness to the people on the integrity of provision of infrastructure at the
local level. The table shows that while decentralization limits opportunities for corruption especially
grand corruption, overall positive impact may be less observable for fitness, sports and recreation
centers due to the non-standard nature of these projects benchmarking of costs may be more difficult
as compared to standard infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges.
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Table 6

. Promise of Decentralization in Reducing Vulnerability to corruption observed in provision of

infrastructure in various sectors
Water and Sanitation

Diminished potential for land acquisition at above market rate due to
wider local knowledge of land values, lower potential for compromising
quality due to improved citizen feedback loops.

Roads, bridges and mass transit

Diminished potential for land acquisition at above market prices,
diminished opportunities for false procurement and maintenance
expenditures, constrained opportunities for false certification of quality
of construction

Electricity

Public utilities: Diminished potential land acquisition at above market
rates and acquiring the rights of way, and false subsidy payments and
public sector guarantees for assured demand for supply at above market
rates.
Private utilities: Reduced potential for corruption in the regulatory
regime due to greater citizen oversight

Hospitals

Eliminates opportunity for ghost hospitals

Schools

Eliminates opportunities for ghost schools

Fitness, sports and Recreation

Little impact on padding up costs

centers
Source: Author’s perspectives

In all, a small yet growing body of theoretical and empirical literature confirms that localization offers
significant potential in bringing greater accountability and responsiveness to the public sector at the
local level and reducing the incidence of grand corruption. While most of this literature is focused on
decentralized provision of all services yet their conclusion apply in equal force to infrastructure as
infrastructure provision dominates local government expenditures.
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5. The Evidence
While a growing number of empirical studies have examined the relationship between
decentralization and corruption, only a handful of these studies have examined the specific impact of
decentralized provision of infrastructure. Santos (1968) discovered that sectoral allocation of spending
improved with participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Isham and Kahkonen (1999) observed
improvements in water services in Central Java, Indonesia with local community management. A World
Bank study (2004) found improvement in a few local government areas in decentralized provision of
water and sanitation services. A study of local government procurement in the Philippines revealed that
(see Tapales, 2001, p.21): “contractors admit to paying mayors of the towns where they have projects,
because , they say, the officials can delay the work by withholding necessary permits or harassing the
workers. Municipal mayors get seven percent while the barangay (village) captain is given three percent.
The heads of implementing agencies – usually the district, municipal or city engineer – get about 10
percent.” A study of canal irrigation in India attributed corruption to centralization of management
(Wade, 1997).
A World Bank study (World Development Report, 1994) compared results under centralized vs
decentralized maintenance of roads and found that countries with decentralized maintenance had
better roads. This finding indirectly implies that with centralized provision there were greater leakage of
public funds through mismanagement, inefficiency, waste and corruption.
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Figure 3. Countries with decentralized road maintenance have better roads
Source: World Development Report, 1994, p.75
Empirical work on the impact of decentralization on the incidence of corruption is seriously hampered
by a lack of reliable data especially on the incidence of corruption. The two most widely used sources
are the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indexes (CPIs) and Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGIs) published by the World Bank. Both measures are seriously flawed and indefensible as
they make false comparisons across countries for any year and over time and for tracking any country
overtime1. Underlying data bases they use simply do not permit such rankings and comparisons as
different sources of survey data and questions with weights that vary overtime for each country and
across countries are used (see Arndt, 2008a,b and Ivanyna and Shah, 2011 for a critique and illustration

1

The editors of this volume take strong exception to the author’s view and state,” While the first statement is
correct - we have a gap of data on governance at the sub- national level, the second statement would need to reconsidered since it seems to suggest that the authors of the indicators are suggesting to use the data to evaluate
governance over time at the sub national level. The authors of the WGI have over and over warned researchers
and practitioners about the limit of their data, meaning of a cross country/cross-year comparison and the objective
of their data: to simply highlight that there is a governance issue in a country. The WGI also seem to be the only
indicators that provide the margin of errors and the sources of the data. The authors also emphasize that the WGI
are not actionable and cannot help to design a policy reform. They are simply a starting point to mobilize public
opinion around this issue (as the CPI).” (May 13, 2013 e-mail to the author, p.3). See also Galtung (2006).
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of this point using data sources and weights used by both CPI and WGI indicators and Ivanyna and Shah,
2011 for an illustration of an alternate methodology). Professor Joel Slemrod, University of Michigan ,
has aptly remarked in another context but his saying applies equally well here, “ Whatever we have
learned is false and whatever we know is half truth. We really do not know what we do know or do not
know.” Moreover, these measures are simply not available at subnational levels. What is needed is a
worldwide survey using uniform questionnaire and employing a stratified random sampling approach in
each country to seek an aggregate view of local perceptions on the incidence of corruption. Ivanyna and
Shah (2011, 2012, 2013) take a first small step in this direction as well as developing subnational
indicators. There is also need for rigorous case study work in this area. In recent years, the University of
Gotenburg and the World Bank has taken small steps to improve our knowledge on quality of
governance at subnational levels.2

6. Overall Impact of Decentralized Provision of Infrastructure on Corruption –
by sector and by type of corruption: Some Tentative Conclusions
Earlier section demonstrated that empirical work on the impact of decentralized provision of
infrastructure is scant. A handful of studies available indicate overall positive influence of
decentralization on the integrity of public infrastructure provision. Given the paucity of evidence, one
cannot, however, reach any conclusive view on this issue. Conceptual literature on the subject, is
however, vast and yet equally inconclusive. While the dominant theme in this literature again is the
positive influence of decentralization in curtailing corruption, yet it cannot serve as the basis for
reaching any definitive conclusions. In fact there is some wisdom in not reaching any conclusive view as
the incidence is case dependent. Much depends upon the history, culture, organization and public and
private sector environment of each case study. Recognizing this important proviso, table 7 presents a
stylized conjectural view of the overall impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the sector
and type of corruption. Short run (SR) impact of decentralization of decentralization on petty corruption
is conjectured to be positive in curtailing corruption for water and sanitation, transportation and
electricity and sports and recreation centers but petty bribes for hospital and school admissions and
drugs may continue and could be perceived to have increased in view of greater access to information
and transparency with decentralization. In the long run, greater local accountability and oversight kicks
in to reduce petty corruption in all sectors. Decentralization is also expected to reduce grant corruption
in all sectors except sports and recreation centers in the short run. For sports and recreation centers in
the short run, it may be difficult to hold local government to account due to a lack of adequate
information in view of the non-standard nature of these infrastructures but in the long run grand
corruption is expected to be reduced in all sectors due to better information and greater local
accountability. State or regulatory captures or clientelism where it persists may not be overcome by
2

See University of Goteburg ,http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/ and the 2012 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS) focus on quality of governance at the sub national level. The BEEPS is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank Group. http://beeps.prognoz.com/beeps/Home.ashx and World Bank Governance
Diagnostic Surveys (http://go.worldbank.org/Q7ZUV9AG)
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decentralization either in the short run or in the long run as these phenomenon are related to the
nature of political and cultural institutions and may be hard to overcome without fundamental political
finance and land reforms. And the latter reforms may be blocked by powerful local elites.

Table 7. Overall Impact of Decentralization on Curtailing Corruption in Infrastructure in developing
countries
Sector
Type of Corruption
Petty
Grand
State or regulatory Clientelism
capture
SR
LR
SR
LR
SR
LR
SR
LR
Water and
+
+
+
+
sanitation
Roads, bridges,
+
+
+
+
mass transit
Electricity - Public +
+
+
+
Electricity- Private +
+
+
+
Hospitals
+
+
+
-Schools
+
+
+
Fitness, sports and +
+
+
recreation centers
OVERALL
?
+
+
+
Source: Author’s perspectives

7. Ensuring Integrity of Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure
: The Way Forward
The decentralized provision of infrastructure holds the promise of curtailing corruption provided there is
no elite capture, strong institutions of accountability in governance, results based governance culture
and an educated and empowered citizenry. These ideal conditions are absent to varying degrees in most
countries. In view of this, one has to tailor institutional design for integrity to individual country and
locality conditions. In the following, we provide a stylized view of such policies based on the initial state
of public governance in the country.
As a starting point, one has to consider unbundling infrastructure services for market competition. By
isolating first the natural monopoly segments of the sector, one can examine range of market
alternatives for unbundling rest of infrastructure provision. This includes regulatory framework that
encourages: (a) competition for substitutes; (b) competition for infrastructure markets; (c) competition
for the right to supply the entire market through leases and concessions; (d) privatization of some
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monopolies to reap efficiency gains; and (e) having national and regional data bases to provide
benchmark on similar operations.
Beyond that one has to apply a “corruption opportunity test” (Khan, 2008) to each case of government
intervention by asking,
1. Is the culture of government organization and environment conducive to corruption?
2. What is the probability that applicable laws, rules, regulations, procedures, instructions or
practices, could be misused or bypassed by corrupt intentions?
3. Are there controls in place that would forestall a corrupt person from indulging in corruption by
abuse of authority or misuse of discretion or misinterpretation or disregard of rules?
Answers to above questions will help in developing location specific safeguards in ensuring integrity of
public financing or provision of infrastructure. In dealing with various forms of corruption in
infrastructure provision, policy and institutional response will vary according to local circumstances.
Table 8 provides a stylized view of such responses in two polar cases of countries and localities with
good and poor governance. The table stresses the importance of more fundamental policy and
institutional reforms in the case of poor governance and mostly direct focus on detection and
punishment of corruption in case of good governance.
Table 9 presents options for improving governance of individual sectors to ensure incorruptible
governance. The table emphasizes creating an incentive cum accountability regime to ensure that all
stakeholders advance public interest. This is best done by introducing a bottom-line for government
where no bottom-line exists, introducing competition to improve voice and exit options for citizens and
strengthening citizens’ oversight of all providers and sunshine provisions to ensure that government and
private providers are subjected to continuous scrutiny. These practices are expected to improve
management of infrastructure provisions and its responsiveness to citizens’ needs and preferences as
well accountability of providers to residents. Such incentives and accountability regime is expected to
improve efficiency, equity and integrity of public provision of infrastructure.
Having a broader local public finance management framework that is focused on incorruptible,
responsible and accountable governance at the local level can also help in safeguarding against
malfeasance and corruption. This framework emphasizes, fiscal transparency, a framework for fiscal
discipline, output-based central-local financing, output based budgeting and activity based costing,
people empowerment, competitive financing and provision with voice and exit options, contractual
rather than life-long local service appointments, output based performance contracts and external
audits (see Shah and Shah, 2006 for details on the institutional framework for FAIR ( fair, accountable,
incorruptible and responsive) governance).
In short the success of decentralized provision of infrastructure with integrity strongly rests on having an
open local government with citizen based accountability framework that is reinforced by results based
higher level financing. Once there is at least a fair level of institutional framework that supports such
local governance, then there are some promising entry points such as open process of zoning or a
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framework for integrity in procurement and results based management that have the significant
potential to curtail corruption at the local level.

Table 8. Ensuring Integrity of Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure:
Options
Type of corruption

Existing state of governance in national and local jurisdictions
Good

Poor

Legislative Capture

Political finance reforms

Establish rule of law, strengthen
institutions of accountability in
governance, land reforms, citizen
empowerment, media independence

Executive capture

Separation of legislative and executive
powers, citizen empowerment

Transparency in governance, antimonopoly and pro-competition legal
framework, results based accountability

Grand corruption at various decision
points

Transparency requirements. Investigations
and Prosecution

Managing for results human resource
framework. Transparency rules. Police,
justice reforms. Output based budgeting
and activity based accounting,
benchmarking, Results based and
competitive financing of all providers. Text
messaging to a complaints bureau,
prosecution, punitive sanctions on
conviction.

Grand corruption in public procurement

Investigations and Prosecution

PFM reforms, corruption opportunity test
framework for procurement, transparency,
competitive open bidding, independent
tender evaluation, simplification of tender
document, smaller size contracts,
benchmarking requirements, severe
sanctions for non-compliance

Grand corruption in public-private
partnerships

Transparency provisions for contracts.
Managerial accountability for safeguarding
public interest. Prohibition on
renegotiating contracts during or post
implementation. Investigations and
Prosecution.

Facilitating private sector development and
enhancement of competition to provide
public services. Transparent and open
contracts subject to legislative ratification,
public scrutiny and examination,
benchmarking requirements,
Investigations and Prosecution

Administrative corruption and theft in
public distribution

Investigations and Prosecution

Rights based approach to public services.
Greater voice and exit options.
Transparency, open management
information system, mopping operations

Conflict of interest by employees

Oversight and sanctions by peers

Citizen complaints bureaus, peer based
sanctions.

Source: Author’s perspectives
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Table 9. Ensuring Integrity of Decentralized Provision of Public Infrastructure:
Options for Sectoral Reforms in developing countries
Sector

Policies for incorruptible management

Water and Sanitation

Commercialized public authority, concessions and lease, local community, user group
oversight, transparency requirements

Roads, bridges and mass transit

Commercialized public authority, concession or lease with tolls, rural roads by
community self-help or user groups, user group oversight, transparency of financial and
service delivery reports

Electricity – Public Utilities

Commercialization of public utilities with
explicit contractual mandates, and citizen
oversight boards, transparency
requirements

Electricity – private utilities

Regulatory oversight on capital and
maintenance, price regulation, Citizens
oversight board, transparency
requirements

Hospitals

Competitive financing of public and
private hospitals to foster competition
Commercialization of public hospitals with
autonomous citizen management and
oversight boards, transparency
requirements

Schools

Competitive financing of public and
private schools to foster competition,
Parents’ committees oversight on all
aspects of school operations, transparency
requirements

Fitness, Sports and Recreation Centers

Citizens’ oversight boards, referenda
provisions for approving new projects,
transparency requirements

Source: Author’s perspectives

8. Concluding Remarks
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize
public decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial. Critics of these reforms argue that
decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption. Proponents of these
reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by
bringing decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers
people to hold government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long
run. They further state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading
infrastructure to underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such
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decentralization is also expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local
financing. These debates, nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of
decentralization on infrastructure provision is scant or non-existent. Empirical work is hampered by a
lack of reliable data on the incidence of corruption. This paper has presented conceptual underpinnings
of the impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesized
scant available empirical evidence to make a case for further empirical research to document the real
world experiences to update our current state of knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to
limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.
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